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TRIAL BY JURY
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate for-
ever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil
cases in the manner to be prescribed by law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.
COURT OF APPEALS
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States,
Inc. v. State1227
(decided January 18, 1990)
Plaintiffs alleged that General Business Law (GBL) section
198-a(k), 1228 violated the state constitutional right to trial by
jury. 1229 Section 198-a(k) provides for arbitration when a
manufacturer may be liable under New York's original Lemon
Law, 1230 to replace a motor vehicle or refund the purchase price.
Additionally, section 198-a(k) compels the manufacturer to
participate in arbitration at the consumer's request. The court of
appeals held that a jury trial was not required because the
replacement remedy was analogous to specific performance and,
therefore, was equitable in nature. The court found that the
refund remedy merely returns the parties to their status quo 12 1
1227. 75 N.Y.2d 175, 550 N.E.2d 919, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1990).
1228. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(k) (McKinney 1988).
1229. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 2.
1230. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988).
1231. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 182, 550 N.E.2d at 922, 551
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and, thus, is also an equitable remedy.
Under New York's original Lemon Law Statute, 1232 if a manu-
facturer was unable to correct a defect on a motor vehicle that
substantially impaired its value, the manufacturer was required to
"(1) replace the motor vehicle with a comparable motor vehicle
or (2) accept return of the vehicle . . . and refund to the con-
sumer the full purchase price . . ,,1233 However, the original
statute did not provide for informal dispute resolution; instead, it
provided for measures that proved to be costly, delay-ridden, and
unfair to the consumer. The legislative response to this problem
was GBL section 198-a(k), 1234 which afforded the consumer the
choice of informal arbitration and compelled manufacturer partic-
ipation at the consumer's request.
In holding that a trial by jury was not required, the court of ap-
peals analogized the replacement remedy of GBL section 198-
a(c)(1) to an action for specific performance where the remedy
"is designed to produce, as nearly as practicable under the cir-
cumstances, the same performance promised under the con-
tract."' 1 2 3 5 Since an action for specific performance is equitable
in nature, it would not have been afforded a jury trial under com-
mon law and, therefore, the plaintiff would not be afforded one
in the present action. The court further rejected plaintiffs
argument that the refund remedy of section 198-a(c)(1) is
"indistinguishable from the legal actions of [1] breach of
warranty... and [2] revocation of acceptance and refund of the
purchase price," 12 36 and therefore requires a jury trial. Under a
breach of warranty theory, the consumer keeps the defective
product and also sues for damages and compensation. The refund
remedy in issue, however, merely allows the consumer to return
the product, resulting in a return to the status quo. Therefore, the
two are distinguishable. Further, the refund remedy is
N.Y.S.2d at 473.
1232. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988).
1233. Id. § 198-a(c)(1).
1234. Id. § 198-a(k).
1235. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 182, 530 N.E.2d at 922, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 473.
1236. Id. (citations omitted).
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distinguishable from a revocation of acceptance and refund,1237
which is a legal remedy for which a jury trial may be had. In a
revocation of acceptance, the consumer first revokes acceptance
and then pursues legal action after the rescission to recover the
consideration previously paid. In contrast, actions for the GBL
refund remedy are maintained for a rescission and plaintiff offers
to return the product in order to return to the status quo. The
court analogized the statutory refund remedy to an action for
restitution which is equitable in nature and would not have
received a jury trial under common law. Plaintiffs also contended
that the arbitration option provided by the GBL 1238 "abridges the
constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court" 1239 because the New York State Constitution provides
that "the supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in
law and equity." 1240 Prior to the legislative enactment of section
198-a(k), the consumer was forced to resolve disputes pertaining
to defective products "by means of nonbinding informal
arbitration programs established by the manufacturers, procedures
which often proved costly for the average consumer and resulted
in long delays and unfair awards." 1241 The enactment of section
198-a(k) provides the consumer with the option of arbitration and
compels the manufacturer's participation if such avenue is chosen
by the consumer.
The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 198-a(k)
unconstitutionally abridged the supreme court's jurisdiction be-
cause "[t]he Constitution gives the Legislature the 'power to alter
and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in eq-
uity.' 1242 Further, the supreme court only has jurisdiction when
1237. See R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-608:6 (3d ed. 1983).
1238. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 198-a(k) (McKinney 1988).
1239. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 183, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 474.
1240. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7(a) ("The supreme court shall have general
original jurisdiction in law and equity and the appellate jurisdiction herein
provided.").
1241. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 179-80, 550 N.E.2d at 920,
551 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
1242. Id. at 184, 550 N.E.2d at 923, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 474 (quoting N.Y.
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the claim is made the subject of litigation. The consumer has the
option of pursuing such litigation or opting out of that avenue in
favor of informal arbitration proceedings. Therefore, until litiga-
tion is chosen as the avenue for the remedy sought, the court has
no jurisdiction. If, however, the consumer chooses litigation ei-
ther by appealing to the supreme court after arbitration, or by
initiating a court action in the first instance, the supreme court
has original jurisdiction over the litigation in either case.
Finally, plaintiffs alleged that GBL section 198-a(k) abridged
their constitutional right to have disputes with consumers adjudi-
cated by a court or public officer because the statute delegates
this authority to private arbiters. The court rejected plaintiffs'
claim because established common law indicates that the legisla-
ture may, by statute, provide for delegation to the private sector,
as long as it does not violate constitutionally guaranteed
rights. 1243 Since the court held that plaintiffs were not guaranteed
a jury trial for claims arising under this statute, there was no
constitutional viola'tion. 1244
The court rejected the dissent's argument that the legislature
may not delegate authority to arbitration tribunals that are
"unlimited by rules of law or evidence .... ",1245 The court
pointed out that "[t]he General Business Law, and the regulations
implementing it, carefully outline standards to guide the arbitra-
tors and authorizes judicial oversight to insure a reasonable basis
for the decision." ' 1246 Moreover, the basis for relief and the
awards available are well-defined and regulated. Therefore, the
court determined that the dissent's concerns were unfounded.
Judge Titone dissented from the opinion of the court. He ar-
gued that the statute in question should be given "close scrutiny"
because it seems to create a separate, compulsory judicial struc-
ture where only certain types of disputes may be resolved. 1247 A
CONST. art. VI, § 30).




1247. Id. at 188-89, 550 N.E.2d at 926, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (Titone, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Givens, Practice Commentary to GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a,
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main concern was the delegation of coercive power "to private
entities, who are not accountable to the public either through the
elective process or the strictures of the Public Officers Law."' 12 48
"[A]rbitrators... who are not elected, removable or otherwise
accountable as public officersfl" 1249 preside over judicial type
proceedings in a class of disputes that have been removed from
the court system. Judge Titone proceeded to list two types of
traditionally recognized non-judicial proceedings in New York,
both of which have been constitutionally upheld because of
judicial participation and oversight in their procedures and
results. 1250 Due process is certainly implicated by "the
delegation of the state's coercive judicial powers to a private
entity. "1251
In addition, Judge Titone questioned whether the legislation
violated the state's separation of powers doctrine. He stated that
upon the legislature's dissatisfaction with the time and expense of
the judicial process, it simply bypassed the judiciary in favor of
private dispute resolution. Judge Titone stated:
If the Legislature may authorize disputants to bypass the judi-
ciary and choose an adjudicative forum supervised by the execu-
tive branch each time it is dissatisfied with the manner in which
the judicial branch is handling a particular class of disputes,
there would be little left to insulate the judiciary from legislative
incursion. 1252
Judge Titone concluded by stating that "bypassing, rather than
improving, the judicial process -- represents an unacceptable in-
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 311, 316 (McKinney 1988)).
1248. Id. at 189, 550 N.E.2d at 927, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
1249. Id. at 190, 550 N.E.2d at 927, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
1250. Id. at 190-91, 550 N.E.2d at 927-28, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79
(Titone, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
1251. Id. at 191-92, 550 N.E.2d at 928, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
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cursion on the province of the judiciary." 1253
Although federal courts have not been confronted with the
constitutionality of legislation that requires arbitration in certain
instances, the Supreme Court of the United States has manifested
a general acceptance and a favorable policy toward contractual
arbitration agreements. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation,125 4 the United States Supreme Court upheld an
arbitration agreement entered into by a plaintiff pursuant to an
employment agreement. The Supreme Court referred to Title 9 of
the United States Code which provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitra-
tion a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract. 1255
The Court stated that unless Congress has evinced an intention
to preclude waiver of arbitration when dealing with a particular
right, parties will be held to the agreement for arbitration that
they had previously entered into. 1256 Since the Court found no
congressional intent to preclude waiver of arbitration with regard
to the age discrimination claim brought by the plaintiff, the par-
ties would be compelled to adhere to the arbitration agreement
entered into by the plaintiff pursuant to his employment agree-
ment. 1257 The Gilmer Court stated that various sections of Title 9
of the United States Code "manifest a 'liberal federal policy fa-
voring arbitration agreements.'" 1258
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has refused to preclude
access to the courts based upon arbitration clauses in employment
contracts when Congress has evinced an intent to make certain
1253. Id. at 194, 550 N.E.2d at 930, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
1254. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
1255. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1989).
1256. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
1257. Id. at 1657.
1258. Id. at 1651 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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rights judicially enforceable. For example, in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Company,125 9 the Supreme Court concluded
that Congress did not intend claims arising under Title V1112 60 to
be precluded by arbitration clauses contained in collective
bargaining agreements. "The purpose and procedures to Title VII
indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final re-
sponsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral de-
cisions would be inconsistent with that goal."
' 12 61
Also, in Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 1262 the
Supreme Court refused to preclude availability of a judicial fo-
rum to workers who unsuccessfully submitted their wage claims
to an arbitral forum and subsequently sought relief under the Fair
Labor Standards Act1263 in the federal court system. The Court
reasoned that:
[B]ecause Congress intended to give individual employees the
right to bring their minimum-wage claims under the FLSA in
court, and because these congressionally granted FLSA rights
are best protected in a judicial rather than in an arbitral forum,
we hold that petitioners' claim is not barred by the prior submis-
sion of their grievances to the contractual dispute-resolution
procedures. 1264
Finally, in McDonald v. City of West Branch,1265 the Supreme
Court held that a federal court should not give res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect to an award received in an arbitral pro-
ceeding of an action arising under 42 United States Code section
1983.1266 The Court concluded that Congress intended for
judicial enforcement of rights arising under that statute, since the
statute actually creates a cause of action. 1267 The Court relied on
its decisions in Barrantine and Gardner-Denver. These two
1259. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
1260. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1989).
1261. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
1262. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
1263. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
1264. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745.
1265. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
1266. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989).
1267. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290.
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opinions concluded "that Congress intended the statutes at issue
in those cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration
could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings
in adjudicating claims under those statutes. '"1268 Further, the
Court concluded that their decisions in Barrantine and Gardner-
Denver "compel the conclusion that [arbitration] cannot provide
an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the
federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed
to safeguard." 1269
Therefore, it seems that the Supreme Court may be favorable to
the provision of the New York Lemon Law providing for arbi-
tration if the statute can be analogized to a contractual provision
entered into between two parties and if Congress has not evinced
an intention to preclude arbitration in the automobile consumer
area.
1268. Id. at 289.
1269. Id. at 290.
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